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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of foreign trade induced product market competition,
upon workplace gender discrimination in urban Mexico as measured by the gender
earnings differential. More than four decades ago, Becker argued that labour market
discrimination was economically inefficient in that discriminating firms must forego a
quantity of profit. Thus, firms with more market power, i.e., firms facing less
competition, may be more likely to discriminate. It therefore follows that competition in
product markets may reduce discrimination in labour markets. The spread of foreign
trade has traditionally been a major factor in increased product market competition.
Hence, Becker’s thesis suggests foreign trade will reduce employment discrimination.
This paper does find evidence of a negative relation between foreign trade linked
competition in product markets and workplace gender discrimination in data from the
Mexican National Urban Employment Survey (Encuesta National de Empleo Urbano).
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1 Introduction
While it is agreed that there have been notable gains from international trade in recent
years, there is lingering concern that trade liberalization, proceeding ever more rapidly
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, has not benefited all but that the
gains have been distributed unevenly both internationally and within countries. In
particular, there is apprehension that trade liberalization has led to marginalization of
the poor in low-income countries. Women are disproportionately among the poor in
many less developed countries. Therefore, there is concern that trade liberalization has
diminished the livelihoods of women in many low-income countries (e.g. Wee 1998).
This paper argues that trade liberalization may improve the relative economic status of
women in low-income countries and that free trade potentially reduces workplace
gender discrimination. This does not contradict claims of the worsening, in absolute
terms, of the economic status of women in the developing world following trade
liberalization. Only, reduction in gender earnings differentials implies the worsening
economic status of women must be due to their overrepresentation in sectors of the
economy particularly susceptible to import or export competition. The problem,
therefore, may be industrial and occupational segregation.
This study examines the effect of foreign trade, upon labour market discrimination in
urban Mexico as measured by the gender earnings differential. It is found that trade
liberalization is associated with a narrower male-female earnings gap. This implies
future trade liberalization under the aegis of the World Trade Organization may improve
the  relative economic status of women in low-income countries. This would be a
significant beneficial effect of the WTO agreement upon low-income countries. The
remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the effect of product
market competition, always intensified by trade liberalization, on labour market
discrimination; Section 3 describes Mexico’s rapid transition from a closed to an open
economy, and, briefly, the extent of workplace gender discrimination in urban Mexico
as measured by the female-male earnings ratio; Section 4 describes the empirical
methodology used to uncover the effect of trade liberalization upon the gender earnings
differential; Section 5 describes the data upon which the empirical analyses are based,
and presents ensuing statistical evidence and related discussion; Section 6 summarizes
these findings and briefly concludes.
2 Product market competition and employment discrimination: The theory and
evidence
More than four decades ago, Becker (1957) advanced the provocative thesis that firms’
discriminatory practices in the hiring and remuneration of workers were economically
inefficient. The author held that firms with a ‘taste for discrimination’, i.e., a preference
for, e.g., male workers, must forego a quantity of profit in the indulgence of this taste.
Such firms may employ more male workers and fewer female workers than is profit
maximizing, paying male workers higher wages than female workers of equivalent skill.
This has the implication that firms better able to withstand a reduction in profit may be
more likely to indulge their taste for discrimination. Thus, firms with more market2
power, i.e., firms facing less competition, may be more likely to discriminate. It
therefore follows that increased competition in product markets may result in reduced
discrimination in labour markets. The spread of foreign trade has traditionally been a
major factor in increased product market competition. Hence, Becker’s (1957) thesis
suggests that foreign trade will reduce employment discrimination.
There is a fair body of evidence, from agriculture, industry, and even sports, in support
of an inverse relation between discriminatory practice and economic performance. Udry
(1996), in a study of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, Sub-Saharan Africa, finds
evidence of gender discrimination in the allocation of agricultural inputs. In many
African households, agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by
different household members. The efficient allocation of inputs requires that the value
of the marginal product of inputs be equalized across household plots. Udry (1996)
finds instead that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than plots
controlled by men. The author estimates that, as a result of this sub-optimal allocation of
agricultural inputs, about six per cent of output is lost. Using plant-level and firm-level
data to examine the relation between profits and female employment, Hellerstein et al.
(1997) find a positive and significant relation between profits and the proportion of
women employed in plants with high levels of product market power. No such
relationship was found for plants with low levels of market power. This is as expected
since it is likely only plants with high levels of market power have super-normal profit
opportunities. Hanssen (1998), in a historical study of the performance of professional
baseball teams in the US, finds a significant positive relationship between the
probability of team victory and the presence of black players in the starting lineup
during the 1950s, when professional sports in the US were far from racially integrated.
There is also growing evidence that improved competition in product markets reduces
discrimination in labour markets. In an influential study of the US banking industry,
Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) find a significant negative relationship between the
market power of local banks and the proportion of females employed. In yet another
study of the US banking industry, Black and Strahan (2001) find that the relative wages
of female bank employees have significantly risen since competition fostering
deregulation of the industry in the mid-1970s. Finally, Black and Brainerd (2000)
unearth evidence that increased competition in the US from imports during the 1980s
caused greater narrowing of the gender wage gap in historically concentrated or non-
competitive industries than in historically non-concentrated industries. This is as
expected if improved competition from trade liberalization reduces employment
discrimination, since the historically non-concentrated industries were competitive even
prior to trade liberalization.
3 The case of Mexico
Over the past 17 years, Mexico, once adherent to policies of import-substituting
industrialization, has transformed itself into one of the world’s most open economies.
Mexico’s enrolment in the GATT in 1986 and the inauguration of NAFTA in 1994 are
two notable events in the nation’s history of trade liberalization (OECD 1996). Indeed,
Mexico entered into multiple free trade agreements in the 1990s and beyond (see
Table 1), including one with the European Union. It is no surprise that there is evidence
consistent with increased competition in Mexican product markets as a result of this
liberalization of trade (e.g. Hanson and Harrison 1999).3
Table 1
Free trade agreements with Mexico
Free Trade Agreement Signed Effective
Mexico - United States and Canada (NAFTA) 17 December 1992 1 January 1994
Mexico - Costa Rica 5 April 1994 1 January 1995
Mexico - Colombia, and Venezuela (G3 - Group of Three) 13 June 1994 1 January 1995
Mexico – Bolivia 10 September 1994 1 January 1995
Mexico – Nicaragua 18 December 1997 1 July 1998
Mexico – Chile 17 April 1998 1 August 1999
Mexico - European Union 24 February 2000 1 July 2000
Mexico – Israel 10 April 2000 1 July 2000
Mexico - El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (Northern Triangle)
29 June 2000 1 April 2001
Source: Secretaria de Economia web page http://www.economia.gob.mx
Foreign trade linked competition in one sector of the Mexican economy, however, far
predates trade liberalization. The maquiladora industry began in 1965 with the
implementation of Mexico’s Border Industrialization Programme. This new programme
was intended to combat unemployment in the border region as a result of the US’s
termination of the bracero programme1 in 1964. This industrialization programme
allowed the unrestricted entry of foreign capital into the border region (Baerresen 1971,
Hunt 1970). Mexican government decrees enacted in March 1971 made the value added
resulting from manufacturing in Mexico the only portion subject to national taxation
(Comercio Exterior 1971). Given inexpensive Mexican labour, manufactured goods
were to be produced in Mexico for export to the United States. Raw materials were to
be imported duty free into Mexico from the US and US import duties on the re-export of
the finished goods were to be levied only on Mexican value added. This policy resulted
in the proliferation, by means of mostly US capital, of export specialized manufacturing
units, called maquiladoras,2 along Mexico’s 2,000-mile northern border. As of January
2002 there were 3,367 maquiladoras employing 1,071,710 workers (INEGI 2002). It is
clear that the maquiladora industry was engaged in competition, in US product markets,
well before the beginnings of Mexican trade liberalization in the mid-1980s.
As regards gender discrimination, the female-male earnings ratio in urban Mexico was
0.7921 in 1987; it fell to 0.7501 by 1991, but rose thereafter, reaching 0.7803 by 1993
(Brown et al. 1999).
Further, Brown et al. (1999) attribute most of this male-female earnings differential to
differences in rewards to endowments than to gender differences in endowments. Thus,
it is evident there is substantial gender discrimination in Mexican labour markets.
                                                
1 The bracero programme was instituted on 4 August 1942, to alleviate a manual labour shortage in the
US on account of the war.
2 The term derives from the Spanish verb maquilar, which means ‘to put together or assemble’.4
Given the extent of gender discrimination in Mexico and the nation’s rapid transition
from a closed to an open economy, an inverse relation between trade-induced product
market competition and labour market discrimination might be adequately tested upon
Mexican labour data.
4 The empirical methodology
Whether improved competition in product markets reduces discrimination in labour
markets is testable upon Mexican labour data in the following three ways. First, the
export-orientation of the maquiladora sector implies that it has historically faced
relatively more product market competition than the rest of the Mexican economy.
Therefore, if it were found that the gender earnings gap has been smaller in
maquiladoras than in the rest of urban Mexican, an inverse relation between trade-
induced product market competition and labour market discrimination might be
construed. This is a ‘differences’ approach to testing the hypothesis.
Second, as discussed, almost the entire Mexican economy has become more open,
hence subject to competition, since the mid 1980s, particularly since the advent of
NAFTA in 1994. Thus, if it were found that the gender earnings gap has narrowed more
rapidly, since trade liberalization, in the non-maquiladora than in the maquiladora
sector, the latter having plausibly been subject to competition all along, an inverse
relation between trade-induced product market competition and labour market
discrimination might be inferred. This is a ‘difference in differences’ approach to testing
the hypothesis akin to Black’s and Brainerd’s (2000) strategy.
Third, tariff elimination under NAFTA has been a phased process with tariffs falling
faster in some sectors than in others, and with certain sectors3 entirely exempt from the
elimination of tariffs. This constitutes a kind of natural experiment for testing the
hypothesis of a negative relation between trade-induced competition in product markets
and labour market discrimination. If it were found that the narrowing of the gender
wage gap has proceeded more rapidly in non-maquiladora4 sub-sectors experiencing
faster reduction in tariffs under NAFTA, it might be concluded that foreign trade
reduces labour market discrimination. This too is a ‘difference in differences’ approach
to testing the hypothesis.
                                                
3 These include supply-managed goods (dairy, poultry, eggs) and several items of sugar. Further,
certain sectors, often dominated by state owned natural monopolies, such as petroleum and power
generation did not even fall within the purview of NAFTA.
4 Increased competition from imports following tariff reduction under NAFTA is irrelevant to the
export-oriented maquiladora sector.5
A higher female-male earnings ratio (lower male-female earnings gap) in
maquiladoras
Assume that log earnings of a male worker is a linear function of, among others,
employment in the maquiladora sector and the logarithm of hours worked. The
logarithm of hours worked is included as a regressor in lieu of the use of log hourly
earnings as the dependent variable so as not to restrict the work hours elasticity of
earnings to one. Hence, let
(1) 11 ln . .ln ' I ab McHX du =+ + + +
describe the log earnings of a male worker, where I  represents earnings, M  is an
indicator variable such that  1 M =  if the worker is employed in a maquiladora,  0 M =
otherwise,  ln H  denotes the log of hours worked, vector  X  includes such variables as
educational attainment, work experience, marital status, occupation, industry of
employment, and region of residence, and u  signifies the regression error. Similarly, let
(2) 22 ln . .ln ' I ab M cHX d u =+ + + +
describe the log earnings of a female worker. (1) and (2) may be combined as
(3) () () 12 1 1 2 1 ln . . . . .ln ' I aa a F b Mb b F M c H X d u =+ − + + − + + + ,
where  1 F =  if the worker is female,  0 F =  otherwise.  Hence, the ratio of the predicted
earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable male worker in the non-
maquiladora sector may be calculated as 
21 ˆˆ aa e
− , where  21 ˆˆ aa −  denotes the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimate of the coefficient of  F  in (3).  On the other hand, the ratio of
the predicted earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable male worker in the
maquiladora sector may be calculated as 
() () 21 21 ˆˆ ˆˆ aa bb
e
−+−
, where  21 ˆˆ bb −  denotes the OLS
estimate of the coefficient of  . F M  in (3). Thus, if the estimated coefficient of the
interaction  . F M  were found to be positive and the variable significant, it may be
concluded that the female-male earnings ratio has been higher in the maquiladora sector
than in the rest of urban Mexico.
Greater increase of the female-male earnings ratio in the non-maquiladora sector
than in the maquiladora sector since trade liberalization
Consider two time periods,  1 t  and  2 t , such that  1 t  predates full trade liberalization
whereas  2 t  is in the post-liberalization era. Let
(4) 11 ln . .ln ' I ab FcHX du =+ + + +
describe the log earnings of a non-maquiladora worker in period  1 t , where, as before,
1 F =  if the worker is female,  0 F =  otherwise. Similarly, let
(5) 22 ln . ln ' I ab F cHX d u =+ + + +
describe the log earnings of a maquiladora worker in period  1 t . Next, assume6
(6) 33 ln . .ln ' I ab F cHX d u =+ + + + .
describes the log earnings of a non-maquiladora worker in period  2 t . Similarly, assume
(7) 44 ln . .ln ' I ab F cHX d u =+ + + +
describes the log earnings of a maquiladora worker in period  2 t .
By (4), the ratio of the earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable male worker
in the non-maquiladora sector, prior to full trade liberalization, equals 
1 b e . By (6), the
ratio of the earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable male worker in the non-
maquiladora  sector, in the post liberalization regime, equals 
3 b e . Thus, the inter-
temporal percentage increase of the female-male earnings ratio in the non-maquiladora
sector is  ()
3
31








−× = −× 
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.
Similarly, by (5), the ratio of the earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable
male worker in the maquiladora sector, prior to full trade liberalization, equals 
2 b e .
Analogously, by (7), the ratio of the earnings of a female worker to that of a comparable
male worker in the maquiladora sector, in the post liberalization regime, equals 
4 b e .
Therefore, the inter-temporal percentage increase of the female-male earnings ratio in
the maquiladora sector is  ()
4
42








−× = −× 
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.
Hence, the percentage increase, from  1 t  to  2 t , in the female-male earnings ratio will
have been greater in the non-maquiladora  sector than in the maquiladora sector if
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where  1 T =  if the time period is  2 t ,  0 T =  otherwise, and, as before,  1 M =  if the
worker is a maquiladora employee,  0 M =  otherwise. Thus, if the estimated coefficient
of the interaction  .. F MT in (8) were found to be negative and the variable significant, it
may be concluded that there has been greater increase, in proportionate terms, of the
female-male earnings ratio in the non-maquiladora sector than in the maquiladora
sector since trade liberalization.7
Greater increase of the female-male earnings ratio in non-maquiladora sub-sectors
with faster tariff reductionunder nafta
Once again, consider two time periods,  1 t  and  2 t , such that  1 t  predates full trade
liberalization whereas  2 t  is in the post-liberalization era. Let
(9) 11 ln . .ln ' I ab FcHX du =+ + + +
describe the log earnings of a non-maquiladora worker in period  1 t . Next, divide the
non-maquiladora sector in period  2 t  into two sub-sectors such that tariffs are entirely
eliminated by period  2 t  in one but not the other. Assume
(10) 22 ln . .ln ' I ab F cHX d u =+ + + +
describes the log earnings in  2 t  of a worker in the sub-sector with 100 per cent
reduction in tariffs. Similarly, assume
(11) 33 ln . .ln ' I ab F cHX d u =+ + + +
describes the log earnings in  2 t  of a worker in the sub-sector with tariffs as yet in place.
The percentage increase, from  1 t  to  2 t , of the female-male earnings ratio in the non-
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− −× . Hence, there will have been greater increase of the female-
male earnings ratio in the non-maquiladora sub-sector with faster tariff reduction if
23 bb > or, equivalently, if  32 0 bb −< .
(9), (10), and (11) may be combined as
(12) () () ()
()
12 1 3 2 1 2 1
32
ln . . . . . .
... . l n ' ,
I aa a Ta a N T b F b b F T
bbF N T cHX d u
=+ − + − + + −
+− + + +
where  1 N =  if the worker is employed in the non-maquiladora sub-sector with less
than a 100 per cent reduction in tariffs. Thus, if the estimated coefficient of the
interaction  .. F NT in (12) were found to be negative and the variable significant, it may
be concluded that there has been greater increase, in proportionate terms, of the female-
male earnings ratio in the non-maquiladora sub-sector with faster tariff reduction under
NAFTA.8
 5 The data and empirical results
Data for this study are drawn from the Encuesta National de Empleo Urbano (ENEU).5
The ENEU provides a quarterly data series that is rich in socio-economic information.
The survey samples about 60 per cent of the nation’s urban population including about
90 per cent of the population in areas with 100,000 or more inhabitants. This study’s
findings are, therefore, likely to be highly pertinent to the entire Mexican urban labour
force.
Table 2 presents the full definitions of the variables included in the analyses. Table 3
presents the sample means of these variables. Column 1 presents sample means
pertaining to the full sample of workers, numbering 203,550, upon which (3) and (8) are
estimated. Column 2 presents sample means pertaining to the sub-sample of non-
maquiladora workers, numbering 196,550, upon which (12) is estimated. Recall that
(12) is estimated upon this sub-sample because increased import competition following
tariff reduction under NAFTA is irrelevant to the export-oriented maquiladora sector
engaged in competition in US product markets since the mid 1960s. By the statistics in
column 1, 79.3 per cent of the 203,550 workers in the full sample are drawn from the
1999 ENEU with the remainder coming from the 1987 round of the survey. 37.5 per
cent of the full sample consists of female workers. Maquiladora workers constitute 3.4
per cent of the full sample. Female maquiladora workers make up 1.7 per cent of the
full sample, implying about half of maquiladora workers are women. Although the
ENEU is an urban survey, 1.6 per cent of the full sample of workers is affiliated to the
agricultural sector (farm industry). It is likely these are landowners who reside in cities
or workers in agro-based industries.
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of (3). Vector  X  is taken to consist of measures of
human capital (Schooling and Experience), marital status (Married), employment in the
formal sector (Formal Sector, since regional minimum wage laws may be flouted in the
informal sector), entrepreneurship (Owner, to capture market compensation for the
bearing of business risk), industrial and occupational affiliation, employer size, and
geographical region of residence. A dummy variable indicating time period (Year 1999)
is also included in vector  X . By these estimates, the ratio of the predicted monthly
earnings of a female worker to that of a strictly comparable male worker in the non-
maquiladora sector is 
0.325 e
− = 0.723. In other words, a female worker earns 27.7 per
cent less on average than a comparable male worker in the non-maquiladora sector. On
the other hand, the ratio of the predicted earnings of a female worker to that of a
comparable male worker in the maquiladora sector is 
0.325 0.195 e
−+ = 0.878. In other words,
a female worker earns only 12.2 per cent less on average than a comparable male
worker in the maquiladora sector. This is a statistically significant difference given the
interaction Female× Maquila is significant at the 1 per cent level.
                                                
5 National Urban Employment Survey.9
Table 2
Definitions of variables
Log Earnings = natural logarithm of monthly earnings in 1999 pesos
Log Hours = natural logarithm of hours worked during week prior to interview
Schooling = years of formal education
= years of work experience calculated as age - years of formal education - 6
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Formal Sector = 1 if employed in the formal sector (legally established business), 0otherwise
Owner =1 if the individual is an entrepreneur
Female = 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Maquila = 1 if employed in the maquiladora sector, 0 otherwise
Year 1999 = 1 if drawn from the 1999 ENEU, 0 if drawn from the 1987 ENEU
Slow Liberalization = 1 if employed in non-maquiladora sub-sector with less than a 100% tariff
reduction by 1999, 0 otherwise
Female× Year 1999 = interaction of Female and Year 1999
Maquila× Year 1999 = interaction of Maquila and Year 1999
Slow Liberalization× Year 1999 = interaction of Slow Liberalization and Year 1999
Key Variables:
Female× Maquila = interaction of Female and Maquila
Female× Maquila× Year 1999 = interaction of Female, Maquila, and Year 1999
Female× Slow Liberalization×
Year 1999
= interaction of Female, Slow Liberalization, and Year 1999
Industry: Omitted Category = Service Sector
Farm
= 1 if employed in agricultural sector, including agro-based industry; 0
otherwise
Mine or Electric = 1 if employed in mining or power sectors, 0 otherwise
Manufacturing = 1 if employed in the manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise
Construction = 1 if employed in the construction sector, 0 otherwise
Commerce = 1 if employed in the commerce sector; 0 otherwise
Occupation: Omitted Category   = Occupation of Labourer
Professional = 1 if a professional, 0 otherwise
Technical = 1 if a technician, 0 otherwise
Managerial = 1 if a manager, 0 otherwise
Firm size: Omitted Category = Single Employee firm
Micro = 1 if employed in firm with 1-5 employees, 0 otherwise
Small = 1 if employed in firm with 6-50 employees, 0 otherwise
Medium = 1 if employed in firm with 51-250 employees, 0 otherwise
Large = 1 if employed in firm with more than 250 employees, 0 otherwise
Region of Residence: Omitted Category = Central Region
Border = 1 if lives on the Mexico-US border, 0 otherwise
North = 1 if lives in a northern state of Mexico excluding the border, 0 otherwise





Full Sample Only Non-Maquiladora
Variable Mean Mean
Log Earnings 7.355 7.335








Year 1999 0.793 0.795
Female× Year 1999 0.308 0.306
Maquila× Year 1999 0.025
Slow Liberalization× Year 1999 0.082
Key Variables:
Female× Maquila 0.017
Female× Maquila× Year 1999 0.012
Female× Slow Liberalization× Year 1999 0.022
Industry:
Farm 0.016 0.017

















n = 203,550 196,550
Source: ENEU.11
Table 4
A comparison of gender earnings differentials in the
Maquiladora and non-Maquiladora sectors
Variable Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 2.499 77.692




Formal sector 0.040 3.806
Owner 1.079 111.587
Female (F) -0.325 -47.068
Maquila (M) -0.290 -11.062
Year 1999 -0.221 -28.989
Key variable:
Female× Maquila (F.M) 0.195 5.893
Industry:
Farm -1.328 -53.074



















 Note: All regressors are significant at the 1% level.
Source: ENEU.12
Table 5
A comparison of inter-temporal changes in gender earnings differentials
between the Maquiladora and non-Maquiladora sectors
OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable = Log Earnings (ln L)
Variable        Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 2.508 77.499




Formal Sector 0.040 3.830
Owner 1.080 111.564
Female (F) -0.360 -24.396
Maquila (M) -0.333 -6.825
Year 1999 (T) -0.235 -24.825
Female× Year 1999 (F.T) 0.043 2.675
Maquila× Year 1999 (M.T) 0.058 1.063
Female× Maquila (F.M) 0.317 4.885
Key Variable:
Female× Maquila× Year 1999 (F.M.T) -0.163 -2.169
Industry:
Farm -1.328 -53.080




















    Note: All regressors save Maquila× Year 1999 and Female× Maquila× Year 1999 are significant at the
1% level. Female× Maquila× Year 1999 is significant at the 5% kevel. Maquila× Year 1999 is
insignificant.
    Source: ENEU.13
It is notable that maquiladora workers, both male and female, earn 25.2 per cent6 less
on average than comparable workers in other sectors of the economy. Lower earnings in
the export-oriented maquiladora  sector are consistent with arguments (e.g. Weston
1999) that competition in global markets is linked to the low and falling living standards
of workers in the export sectors of developing nations as employers are driven to cut
costs.
There are a number of other notable subsidiary findings. Ceteris paribus, real earnings
were 19.83 per cent7 lower in 1999 than in 1987. Returns to entrepreneurship appear
high in urban Mexico in that the ratio of the predicted earnings of an
owner/entrepreneur to that of a comparable employee is 2.942.8 The rate of return to
schooling is estimated at 3.6 per cent, and that to work experience, at 0.5 per cent. It
appears that married workers earn significantly more than single workers. As
anticipated, earnings are significantly higher in the formal sector than in the informal
sector.
Table 5 presents OLS estimates of (8). Time periods  1 t  and  2 t  are taken to be the years
1987 and 1999, respectively. Given Mexico enrolled in the GATT only in 1986, it is
accurate to say the nation was only beginning to liberalize imports in 1987. On the other
hand, given NAFTA became effective in 1994, 1999 may be considered to be in the
post-liberalization era. Vector  X  is, as before, taken to consist of measures of human
capital, marital status, employment in the formal sector, entrepreneurship, industrial and
occupational affiliation, employer size, and geographical region of residence. The
estimated coefficients of these regressors are not dissimilar in sign and magnitude to
their counterparts in Table 4.
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that the female-male earnings ratio in the non-
maquiladora sector increased by 4.394 per cent9 between 1987 and 1999. In contrast,
the female-male earnings ratio in the maquiladora sector actually decreased by 11.308
per cent10 in the same period, though yet remaining higher than in the non-maquiladora
sector. This is a statistically significant difference given the interaction
Female× Maquila× Year 1999 is significant at the 5 per cent level. It may be construed
as evidence that increased competition from imports since the liberalization of trade has
played a role in reducing the gender earnings gap in sectors of the urban economy
subjected to such competition, since the gap appears instead to have widened in the
sector not subjected to import competition, namely, the export-oriented maquiladora
sector.
                                                
6 ()
0.290 1 100 e
− −×
7 





0.043 1 100 e −×
10 ()
0.043 0.163 1 100 e
− −×14
Table 6
A comparison of inter-temporal changes in gender earnings differentials
between non-Maquiladora sub-sectors with fast and slow tariff reduction
OLS estimates, dependent variable = log earnings (ln L)
Variable Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 2.493 75.504




Formal Sector 0.039 3.704
Owner 1.083 109.798
Female (F) -0.355 -23.704
Year 1999 (T) -0.227 -23.092
Female× Year 1999 (F.T) 0.055 3.321
Slow liberalization× Year 1999 (N.T) -0.042 -2.687
Key Variable:
Female× Slow Liberalization× Year 1999 (F.N.T) -0.196 -7.669
Industry:
Farm -1.310 -50.497



















  Note: All regressors are significant at the 1% level.
  Source: ENEU.15
Table 6 presents OLS estimates of (12). As before, vector  X  is considered to include
measures of human capital, marital status, employment in the formal sector,
entrepreneurship, industrial and occupational affiliation, employer size, and
geographical region of residence. The estimated coefficients of these regressors are
similar in sign and magnitude to their counterparts in Tables 4 and 5. By the remaining
estimates, the female-male earnings ratio increased by 5.654 per cent11 during 1987–99
in the non-maquiladora sub-sector with 100 per cent reduction in tariffs. In contrast, the
female-male earnings ratio actually decreased by 13.151 per cent12 in the non-
maquiladora sub-sector with less than complete elimination of import duties. This is a
statistically significant difference given the interaction Female× Slow
Liberalization× Year 1999 is significant at the one per cent level. In other words, a
narrowing of the male-female earnings gap in the non-maquiladora sector since the
advent of NAFTA appears restricted to the sub-sector in which tariffs were completely
eliminated by 1999. As argued, this may be interpreted as evidence that trade
liberalization has played a role in reducing gender discrimination in urban Mexican
labour markets.
5.1 Gender and trade
The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), among others, opines
that trade liberalization has diminished the livelihoods of large sections of women in
less developed countries. It is argued that female employment in low-income countries
is concentrated in small and medium scale industries, often in the informal sector. These
are particularly vulnerable to import and export competition from trade liberalization.
Further, many export industries have favoured the hiring of women with the result that
employment in export-oriented manufacturing production has tended to become
feminized. Hence, it is held that trade liberalization has increased competition between
women in different low-income countries, with the result that their wages and working
conditions have deteriorated. It is contended, for example, that women in many
developing country export industries are increasingly driven to accept unconventional
and poorer paying forms of employment in the informal sector, such as home-
production.
Evidence of a negative relation between trade liberalization and the gender earnings
differential in urban Mexico is relevant to this bleak view of gender and trade. The
widespread deterioration of women’s living standards would be consistent with a
general narrowing of the gender earnings gap only if women were concentrated in
sectors of the economy particularly vulnerable to import and export competition.13
Given that the liberalization of trade will gain momentum under the WTO agreement,
this paper’s findings suggest that the livelihoods of women in low-income countries
might be protected only if such sectoral concentration of female workers were
prevented.
                                                
11 ()
0.055 1 100 e −×
12 ()
0.055 0.196 1 100 e
− −×
13 Since women must make absolute gains in the sectors seeing improvement in wages and working
conditions.16
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of past trade liberalization on workplace gender
discrimination in urban Mexico. It uncovers evidence that trade-induced product market
competition is associated with a higher female-male earnings ratio i.e., with a lower
gender earnings gap. This suggests that the WTO agreement will lead to reduction of
workplace gender discrimination in low-income countries.
Specifically, this paper finds that the female-male earnings ratio is significantly higher
in the export-oriented maquiladora sector than in the rest of urban Mexico. Since the
maquiladora sector has long been engaged in competition in US product markets, this
suggests trade-induced product market competition reduces labour market
discrimination. Next, it is found that decline in the gender earnings gap between 1987
and 1999, a period of rapid trade liberalization, is confined to the non-maquiladora
sector. Indeed, the female-male earnings ratio decreased in the maquiladora  sector,
though yet remaining higher than in the non-maquiladora sector. Since the maquiladora
sector, by its export orientation, is unaffected by import competition, the fact that
decline in the gender earnings differential is restricted to the non-maquiladora sector
suggests that reduction in import tariffs had a role to play. Lastly, this study finds that,
within the non-maquiladora sector, decline in the gender earnings gap between 1987
and 1999 is confined to the sub-sector experiencing an elimination of import tariffs. In
fact, the female-male earnings ratio decreased in the sub-sector with less than a 100 per
cent tariff reduction. This suggests that the elimination of import tariffs potentially
reduces workplace gender discrimination.
This paper’s findings may be taken as support for Becker’s (1957) thesis of a negative
relation between product market competition and labour market discrimination. They
also imply that the WTO agreement has potential to improve the relative economic
status of women in low-income countries. Finally, the findings imply that deterioration,
in absolute terms, of the livelihoods of large sections of women in the developing world
must be due to their overrepresentation in economic sectors particularly vulnerable to
import and export competition.
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